Comment: Taxing Disentailment Sales by Boehm, R. T.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 21 | Issue 1
1969
Comment: Taxing Disentailment Sales
R. T. Boehm
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
R. T. Boehm, Comment: Taxing Disentailment Sales, 21 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 72 (1969)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol21/iss1/5
[Vol. 21:72
COMMENT
Taxing Disentailment Sales
R. T. Boehm*
"Future Interests is not properly a course but an obses-
sion ... 
Philip Mechem, 1933.
"The law of taxation is more concerned with the substance of
economic opportunity than with classifying legal concepts, and
tagging them with names and labels."2
Justice Cardozo, 1934.
"[T]ax law ...is not a self-contained system, but rather is
part of the larger process of social control that we call law."3
Boris I. Bittker, 1966.
I. INTRODUCTIONf ISENTAILMENT SALES4 to clear the titles to land are a recurring
part of the lawyer's work in the area of conveyances of real
property. These sales have become increasingly common as the exo-
dus from rural communities to urban centers has been accelerated by
* THE AUTHOR: R. T. BOEHM (B.A., Capital University; B.S. in Bus. Ad., and
J.D., Ohio State University; Certified Public Accountant, Ohio) is a practicing attorney
in Columbus, Ohio. He is a former Lecturer in Law at Ohio State University College
of Law and at the University of Cincinnati. Portions of this article are reproduced from
Taxation of Disentailment Sales by Mr. Boehm, which appeared in 15 PRAc. LAW 77
(1969).
1 Mechem, Book Review, 19 IOwA L. REV. 146, 149 (1933).
2 Frueler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 49 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
3 Bittker, Does Tax Practice by Accountants Constitute the Unauthorized Practice
of Law?, 25 J. TAXA'noN 184, 187 (1966).
4 The term disentailment historically had a limited technical use to describe the
process by which the holder of a fee tail estate relieved the land of the restrictive effect
of the entail. Thus, "[a] complete disentailment is effected when land is set free from
the claims both of the issue in tail and of estates and interests subsequent to, or in de-
feasance of, the estate tail. This result follows (under modern English law) when the
tenant in tail effectively disposes of the land in fee simple . 24 HALSBURY'S LAWS
OF ENGLAND § 455 (1912). Disentailment by deed, authorized in 1833, replaced an-
cient judicial procedures that employed transparent legal fictions to terminate the fee
tail. Fines and Recoveries Act, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74 (1833).
For purposes of this Comment, disentailment will be used in a broader context to
mean the act of relieving a land estate from the burden of a future interest. This
broader usage recognizes that some jurisdictions use the judicially supervised disentail-
ment sale in connection with future interests other than those inherent in the fee tail.
For example, the Ohio statute that permits disentailment of the fee tail has been referred
to as the "disentailing" or "disentailment" statute. Bennett v. Fleming, 105 Ohio St.
352, 363, 137 N.E. 900, 903 (1922); State ex rel. Ehmann v. Schneider, 78 Ohio App.
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population growth, increased social mobility, and soaring increases in
land values accompanied by depression of agricultural income. A
product of this development in the real estate market is the liquida-
tion of family farms burdened with future interests. In order to
market land burdened by several particular future interests5 the disen-
tailment sale is required. These sales require that the attorney be
cognizant of the complicated law of future interests. Additionally,
the special nature of the disentailment sale raises unique federal
tax problems. This Comment exhausts neither the future interest
nor the tax problems: Instead, it outlines the context in which the
problems arise and suggests the federal tax results created by their
combination.
II. THE FUTURE INTEREST PROBLEM
Modern forms of entailment - excluding transactions in trust
normally involve one or more legal life estates followed by a
remainder in presently ascertainable remaindermen, in somebody's
heirs, or in some other unborn persons. In each of these situa-
tions, the present life tenant may be unable to convey the land
in fee simple to a third party. The difficulty presented by the lat-
ter two situations arises because neither an unknown heir nor an un-
born remainderman can join with the other interest holders to sell
by consensual conveyance. Unborn children and heirs of the liv-
ing cannot be identified until the death of the ancestor. 6  The im-
possibility of ascertaining the remaindermen is an inherent charac-
teristic of several types of future interests. These include class
gifts7 and interests to be created by power of appointment.8 The
27, 31, 67 N.E.2d 117, 119 (1946). This statute provides for the sale of land burdened
by other future interests. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5303.21 (Page 1953) [hereinafter
cited as CODE]. See also note 15 infra. Additionally, the equity power under which
courts order a sale of land exists irrespective of any distinction between the fee tail and
other future interests. See Beliveau v. Beliveau, 217 Minn. 235, 14 N.W.2d 360
(1944).
5 See notes 7-10 infra & accompanying text.
6 See Pollack v. Speidel, 17 Ohio St. 489 (1867); Note, The Fee Tail in Ohio, 17
OHio ST. L.J. 335 (1956).
This disability might also apply to sales of trust property where the remaindermen
are not presently identifiable; but, in most cases, under trust law the trustee can make
the sale. Gain from a sale by a trustee is taxable to the trustee by reason of explicit
statutory language. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 641(a) [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.].
In the non-trust situation, the similar need arises for either statutory or judicial authori-
zation to sell land burdened with these future interests if good title is to pass to the
buyer. Lacking such authorization, the life tenant would be able to transfer only his
interest - presumably an unsatisfactory arrangement for the purchaser.
7 The dass gift involves donees comprising an amorphous group that can be ascer-
tained only after the occurrence of some event, for example, a devise to A for life,
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problem of identifying the remaindermen also arises in two other
situations, both involving ancient interests in land. One type is the
Shelley's Case9 conveyance wherein A conveys to B for life, and then
to the heirs of B. The second type is the fee tail estate, involving a
grant to C and the heirs of his body. Finally, even ascertainable
remaindermen can present conveyancing difficulties if they refuse
to join with the other interest holders in conveying the property.' 0
The conveyancing dilemma presented by these situations arises
because no power to convey all the legal interests in the land was
explicitly conferred on anyone by the original grant that created the
various successive interests. Lacking judicial or statutory authoriza-
tion, no one can convey full title to a purchaser when land is bur-
then to B for life, and on B's death to the living children of B. There can be no certainty
of identity of all the remaindermen until B dies and is unable to have additional chil-
dren, and the living offspring can be identified. For a general discussion of class
gifts, see T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE IN-
TEPESs 138-51 (1966).
8 The power of appointment is a device for delegation of authority to convey or per-
haps to create a future interest. This popular estate planning tool probably is most
often used in connection with trust arrangements; however, it can be used also in a dis-
position of legal interests in land without a trust. 0, the owner of land, may grant a life
estate to A, with the remainder to any such person to whom A may appoint by will.
The problem of the unascertainable remainderman is present in this case. Assuming
that A exercises this power, it is apparent that a sale of the appointive assets during A's
life cannot be accomplished by consensual conveyance. For a general discussion of
powers of appointment, see T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 7, at 152-82.
9 Wolfe v. Shelley, 76 Eng. Rep. 199 (K.B. 1581). This device is rooted in the
historical development of the early "tax" consequences flowing from encumbered prop-
erty. For several centuries after the Norman era, counsel for the landed gentry of Eng-
land devised tax avoidance maneuvers, the relics of which still affect modem land
law. Numerous feudal obligations did not follow land which was acquired by pur-
chase, but did attach to land which descended to the heirs. Thus the objective was to
convert inheritance into purchase. This eliminated feudal duties, a form of tax avoid-
ance. Judicial responses historically nullified these maneuvers so as to preserve to
the landlord the feudal incidents. The Rule in Shelley's Case, see text accompanying
notes 28-29 infra, was a judicial response to the deprivation of the lords' fruits of
seignory. The effect of the Rule was to collapse the successive interests into one estate
by extinguishing the remainder in the heirs of the life tenant. This gave the life tenant
a fee simple and caused his heirs to take by descent, which preserved the feudal incidents,
a form of tax. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.40 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952)
[hereinafter cited as CASNER].
Another technique was the term for life or years followed by a remainder to the
grantor's heirs. To accomplish this, the following conveyance was developed: 0 to A
for life, then to the heirs of 0. This technique fared no better; the English courts cir-
cumscribed its use by creating the Doctrine of Worthier Title. 3 R. POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY 306-07 (1967). Thus the attempt to convey a fee simple to one's heirs fol-
lowing an intervening life estate was treated as ineffectual and the property moved to
the next generation by descent, with the feudal duties intact The interest of the gran-
tor was treated as a reversion in the grantor at the termination of the life estate so that
the heirs took by descent rather than by purchase. Here again, the attempt to defeat
the lord's feudal taxes was nullified. Id.
10 For a discussion of uncooperative but ascertainable remaindermen, see note 25
infra.
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dened by future interests without an express power to sell all the
interests.
Because of the practical limitations on the merchantability of
title, a power to sell must be based upon competent authority.
Modern case law recognizes that based upon their inherent equity
power, courts may order a sale of land."1 When a disentailment
sale is sought in a jurisdiction recognizing the equity power of its
courts to authorize the sale, the seller may seek a disentailment de-
cree. The order usually prescribes the manner of sale and provides
for judicial supervision over the proceeds, and the court retains con-
tinuing control over the eventual distribution. Normally the fund
is held for distribution to remaindermen upon the happening of
some future event. The proceeds are kept in a judicially created trust,
and a trustee is appointed to take possession of the fund.' The
trustee then carries out duties similar to those required in an inter
vivos or testamentary trust,' 3 including payment of the investment
income to the life tenant, followed by eventual payment of the cor-
pus to the remaindermen.
In addition to disentailment sales accomplished under the author-
ity of judicial decrees, many states have enacted statutes,' 4 some
"1 Equity courts have inherent power to order a sale of land even though it is affected
with a future interest. This exclusive American doctrine was first articulated in 1850.
See Bofil v. Fisher, 3 Rich. Eq. 1, 55 Am. Dec. 627 (S.C. 1850). Proceeds from the
sale are held in trust for the benefit of the parties as their interests may appear. L.
SIMES, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS 113 (1966); 4 L. SIMES &
A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 225 (2d ed. 1956); 33 AM. JuR. Life
Estates § 265 (1941); Rogers, Removal of Future Interest Encumbrances - Sale of
the Fee Simple Estate, 17 VAND. L REV. 1437 (1964). This technique had been ab-
sorbed into the general body of American law by the latter part of the 19th century.
4 L SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra at 232 (citing cases in Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Mis-
sissippi, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin). For additional precedents from Arkan-
sas, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and South Carolina, see Rogers,
supra, at 1444. Minnesota recognized the disentailment sale based on equitable prin-
ciples by a strong, modem precedent, without the aid of a statute. Beliveau v. Beli-
veau, 217 Minn. 235, 14 N.W.2d 360 (1944).
12 This result follows in most jurisdictions whether the sale's authorization is
founded on the courts' equity power or is based on legislative enactment. In Ohio the
court supervises statutory management standards. See CODE § 5303.28 (Page Supp.
1968).
:1 The differences between a testamentary trust, an inter vivos trust, and a judicial
trust created pursuant to a disentailment decree disappear when federal income taxes
are considered. I.R.C. § 641(a) specifies similar tax treatment for "property held in
trust, including (1) income [including capital gains] accumulated in trust for the bene-
fit of unborn or unascertained persons or persons with contingent interests, and income
accumulated or held for future distribution under the terms of the will or trust ......
(emphasis added). For a discussion of a partially developed body of law defining a
trust for federal income tax purposes, see 6 J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§§ 36.21.27 (1968); Moore & Sorlien, Homeless, Income, 8 TAX L. REV. 425 (1953).
14 Many statutes detail the handling of the proceeds of entailed estates. The Mary-
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quite comprehensive,15 authorizing and regulating such sales. This
statutory disentailment pattern may be viewed as creating a quasi-
trust implemented by action of the court."8 These statutes might
require a trustee to post a bond, account for the fund,'7 properly in-
vest the proceeds of sale,'" and distribute the fund to the ultimate
beneficiaries.' 9 There might also be a provision for participation on
behalf of minors and unborn beneficiaries, perhaps under the doc-
trine of virtual representation.20
In summary, the disentailment sale provides the means to con-
vey land even though it is encumbered by limited tenancies followed
by future interests. The purchaser thus receives an assured market-
able title. The interests of the ultimate beneficiaries are protected
by the court-supervised management of the proceeds which are held
in trust for their benefit. The life tenant is enabled to convert his
interest in property into a lump sum, or he may receive for life the
land, Ohio, and Wyoming statutes set out detailed provisions for the administration of
the disentailment sale. See Table at end of Comment infra. In other states the disentail-
ment sale is covered by statutes dealing with partition. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH,
supra note 11, at 234; Schnebly, Power of a Life Tenant or Remainderman to Extingush
Other Interests by Judicial Process, 42 HARV. L. REV. 30, 61-62 (1928); Schnebly, An
Illinois Act for the Extinguishment of Future Interests Through Judicial Sales, 24 ILL.
L. REV. 853 (1930), commenting on ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 22, §§ 6, 50 (Smith-Hurd
1968). For comparable English legislation, see Browder, Future Interest Reform, 35
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1255, 1274 (1960).
15 For example, the Ohio statute enumerates a variety of estates which are subject to
disentailment, all referred to here as entailed estates. The Ohio law includes life tenan-
des, fees in tail, qualified and conditional fees, or other qualified, conditional or deter-
minable interests. It also reaches the interests of trustees and beneficiaries. CODE §§
5303.21 (Page 1953), 5303.211 (Page Supp. 1968).
There is no requirement that the owners of the various interests agree to the disen-
tailment proceeding. Oyler v. Scanlon, 33 Ohio St. 308 (1878). The disentailment
statute provides for participation on behalf of minors. CODE § 5303.24 (Page 1953).
In many cases where actual consent to the sale is not possible, the courts permit fore-
closure of the interests of unborn beneficiaries under the doctrine of virtual representa-
tion. The doctrine permits persons not in being, or absent, to be represented by parties
in a suit who have essentially the same property interest under the theory that the inter-
ests of those represented will be adequately protected. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32
(1940); Wing v. Wing, 212 Ark. 960, 208 S.W.2d 776 (1948); Prinz v. Beard, 121
Ohio St. 36, 166 N.E. 905 (1929); Schneider v. Wolf, 120 Ohio St. 524, 166 N.E. 679
(1929); 30A AM. JuR. 2D Judicial Sales § 14 (1958).
16 The term quasi-trust has been used judicially to describe arrangements similar to
those created pursuant to disentailment statutes. The courts have adopted the term
when determining whether a property arrangement will be taxed as a trust. See Robin-
son v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 253 (D. Ga. 1961). The term has been used by Ohio
courts. See Johnson v. Johnson, 51 Ohio St. 446, 38 N.E. 61 (1894). See also 1 G.
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 214-19 (2d ed. 1965); Annot., 137 A.L.R. 1054
(1942).
17 See CODE § 5303.28 (Page Supp. 1968).
18 See CODE § 5303.27 (Page Supp. 1968).
'9 See CODE § 5303.26 (Page 1953).
20 See note 15 supra.
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income from the trust. However, the benefits flowing from the
sale produce federal tax consequences affecting the trustee, the re-
maindermen and the life tenant.21
III. TAXING THE SALE OF PROPERTY
SUBJECT TO CONTINGENT FUTURE INTERESTS
Whether a sale is voluntary or judicially directed, it is subject to
federal income taxation in the year of sale.' The simplest type of
sale of successive interests involves the sale of property subject to a
life estate, or a term for years, followed by a specific remainder, or
reversion, in some presently ascertainable individual. Irrespective
of whether the life estate and the remainder are sold separately or
together, resolving the federal tax problems following the sale pre-
sents little difficulty. The process simply involves determining the
purchase price paid for each interes 3 and allocating the federal
tax basis between the interests. 4 No special tax consequences result
from a distribution following a judicial sale, even if an ascertain-
able remainderman opposes the distribution.2' 5 The problem, how-
21 See note 13 supra.
22 I.ILC. § 61(a)(3). See Helvering v. Brtun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940); Lucas v. North
Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11 (1930); Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255
U.S. 509 (1921); Commissioner v. Segall, 114 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1940).
23 Usually a life tenant and a remainderman may join together to sell their respec-
tive interests. When they agree to do so, the sale price for each interest will normally
be a matter for negotiation between them. Where they make the sale consensually, a
court may permit the capital sum to be divided between them according to some method
of commutation. 33 AM- JuR. Life Estates § 275, at 768 (1941). Of course, each of the
parties is taxable separately according to the price received for the respective interest
sold.
In the absence of consent, most jurisdictions do not permit division of the proceeds,
requiring instead that the fund remain intact. The income is paid to the life tenant
and the corpus is held for the remainderman. Id. §§ 272-76. This investment and
delayed distribution to the remaindermen create special federal income tax problems
much like the disentailment cases.
24 The total federal income tax basis assigned to divided or successive interests is
always the same, just as though no such common or future interest complications existed.
E.g., Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428 (1941). Under Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-5
(1957), the original basis is the same, but as time passes, the relative basis of the life
tenancy decreases and the remainderman's basis increases. Contra, Sayers F. Harmon,
4 T.C. 335 (1944), acquiesced in 1945 CUM. BULL. 3. For an instance where basis was
divided between the life tenancy and the remainder interests, see Eileen M. Hunter,
44 T.C. 109 (1965).
25 An uncooperative remainderman comes within the purview of most disentail-
ment statutes. Although his consent to a sale is not required, the court must insure the
remainderman's protection. If a sale were to result in both a benefit to the life tenant
and protection of the remainderma's interests, it would probably be authorized. See
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 179, Note on Statutory Sale for Reinvestment - Statu-
tory Trends, at 697-711 (1936); Annot., 76 A.L.R. 540 (1932). For an example of
statutory language suggesting authority for the sale of an uncooperative remainder-
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ever, is quite different when the remaindermen cannot be presently
identified. Here, an element of uncertainty is introduced, raising
the question of who must pay the tax on the sale. This question is
presented whenever there exists any of the particular species of
future interests discussed in part II of this Comment.
Future interests that will be created by the exercise of a power
of appointment, for example a special testamentary power,26 will
involve unascertainable remaindermen. Similarly, gifts of future
interests to a class whose identity has not been determined 21 will
raise an element of uncertainty about liability for the tax. The
problem also arises in the majority of states where the Rule in
Shelley's Case has been repealed. Historically, where a single con-
veyance created a life estate in the first grantee, followed by a re-
mainder interest in the heirs, or the bodily heirs of the life tenant,
the grant was telescoped by judicial construction into one simple
present interest. For more than five centuries, English courts treated
the first taker as the sole named grantee, and construed his interest
as an estate either in fee simple or in fee tail.28 Most American
states have abolished the Rule in Shelley's Case; out of this comes
the tax problem. 9 By restoring the two-generation succession ob-
viously intended by the grant, the effect is to separate the life estate
from the contingent remainder, thereby raising the question of who
is to pay the tax on the sale of the burdened property.
A more complicated type of future interest raising the same tax
question is the fee tail. Since the early Norman era, an effective
man's interest, see CODE § 5303.21 (1953). Indeed, a court might decree such a sale
under its equity power, given the presence of the factors which would justify a statutory
sale. Cf. Beliveau v. Beliveau, 217 Minn. 235, 14 N.W.2d 360 (1944).
26 A special testamentary power enables the donee to exercise by his will a power
of appointment in favor of persons other than himself or his estate. T. BERGiN & P.
HASKELL, supra note 7, at 154-55.
27 An example of such a presently undeterminable class would be the children of A
when A is two-years old.
2828 AM. JuR. 2D Estates §§ 102-29 (1966); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 1161 (1965).
2 9 These peculiar federal income tax problems emerge from judicial sales required
in more than three dozen states that have abolished the Rule in Shelley's Case. See
CASNER, supra note 9, at 493; 3 R. POWELL, supra note 9, at 300; 4A G. THOMPSON,
REAL PROPERTY § 2012 (1961); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 1161, 1165 (1965). These
statutes restore the two-generation effect intended by the language of the original grant,
which in turn produces the attendant uncertainties of present identification that under-
lie the difficulties of taxing disentailment sales. Notice that two common law prop-
erty rules were abolished by American statutes working in opposite directions. The fee
tail, originally devised to extend land entailment for many generations, has been
eliminated by statute, either by creating a fee simple in the first donee or by producing
the same practical effect in the hands of the second generation. In contrast, laws
abolishing the Rule in Shelley's Case have added another generation to the duration of
the grant by eliminating the full-title-now result which flowed from the Rule.
DISENTAILMENT SALES
estate tail would result in continuous retention of land by a family
because successive takers were denied the power to convey outside
the bloodline and because the family's entailed inheritance was in-
sulated from the demands of creditors. ° The typical common law
entailment involved a grant to A and the heirs of his body. Thus
a father might give property to his son and to his male bodily heirs
(a fee tail male), or to male bodily heirs resulting from a certain
marriage (a fee tail male special). a In its modern form, the fee
tail is similar to a life estate followed by a contingent remainder.
In American jurisprudence, the fee tail is seldom recognized in
its classic form. Through legislation most states have directly or
indirectly converted the fee tail into a fee simple.Y2  In many juris-
dictions the estate is merely a conveyancing curiosity, having no
practical legal effect. In these jurisdictions the statute produces at
once a salable fee simple through elimination of the interests of
succeeding generations. The capital gains tax following the sale of
such land is borne solely by the seller, just as in the sale of a fee
simple. Other statutes have modified the fee tail by recognizing in
30 By the 13th century, common law courts were limiting fee tail grants in a manner
calculated to avoid the entailment result. They did this by construing the grant to be a
fee simple, subject to the condition that the grantee have a child. Once the child was
born, the grantee was free to convey the land in fee simple. CASNER, supra note 9, at
78. However, the effect of the fee tail estate was fully restored by the Statute De Donis
Conditionalibus, 13 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1285), which enforced the entailment and provided
for reversion on failure of issue. 28 AM. JuR. 2D Estates § 441, at 129 (1966). After
De Donis, unbarrable entails continued for almost two centuries, until 1472, when the
means to terminate the estate by common recovery was judicially recognized. Ulti-
mately, the tenant in tail was permitted by statute to levy a fine that would bar the heirs
of the tenant in tail. 4 Hen. VII, c. 24 (1487); 32 Hen. VIII, c. 28, §§ 1, 2 (1540);
W. FRATCHER, PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 22-27 (1955). The fee tail
estate was finally abolished in England by the Law of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20
(1925).
31 The fee tail enabled the donor to give land to his immediate family while at the
same time insuring against alienation outside the immediate blood line. An early form
of the entail, the -maritagium, permitted a donor to give land to his son-in-law for sup-
port of the donor's daughter and the children of the marriage. Restrictions were at-
tached to the gift to insure against the son-in-law's improvidence and failure of issue
from the marriage. A further restriction normally followed which provided that the
land would ultimately go to the children of the daughter rather than to the issue of the
son-in-law through a second marriage. Fratcher, Restraints on Alienation of Legal In-
terests in Michigan Property, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 675, 685 (1952). For additional dis-
cussion of the fee tail's purpose, see W. FRATcHER, supra note 30, at 17.
32 In a majority of jurisdictions the legislatures have resolved the inherent difficul-
ties of alienation of the fee tail interest by a direct statutory conversion of the fee tail
into a fee simple in the grantee. Similar results have followed from legislation giving
to the fee tail grantee the legal right to convey the estate free from the entailment limita-
tions. Sale of a converted fee tail estate will, of course, give rise to the same federal tax
consequences that inhere in the sale of ordinary land tities. See AM. JuR. 2D Estates
§§ 54, 55 (1966); CASNER, supra note 9, at 117; L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 11,
at 356; 4A G. THOMPSON, supra note 29, at 505.
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the first donee the approximate equivalent of a life estate 3  and
then later, at his death, by converting the succeeding interest into a
fee simple vested in his bodily heirs."4 The result is to produce a
two-step delayed effect with abolition of the entailment postponed
until the second generation takes over.35  In these states disentail-
ment sales present the question of who bears the federal tax allo-
cable to the contingent remainder. Because the identity of the con-
tingent remainderman is unknown, it is impossible for him to pay
the tax. The same result obtains in those few states where the an-
cient common law fee tail might still exist.8 6 There too, when the
33 The theoretical variations in the fee tail statutes are inconsequential for federal
tax purposes, except where they cause the two-generation characteristics of the estate.
The interests of the life tenant and the contingent remaindermen are similar to the in-
terests of the first donee in tail and the heirs of the donee. For a discussion of the
technical differences between the life estate and the interest of the first donee in tail,
see Williams v. Haller, 13 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 329, 336 (C.P. 1912). There is also the
theoretical possibility of the failure of issue of the life tenant, which carries with it the
possibility of reversion to the grantor at the death of the first donee in tail. See Cultice
v. Mills, 97 Ohio St. 112, 119 N.E. 200 (1918); Kohler v. Ichler, 116 Ohio App. 16,
186 N.E.2d 202 (1961).
34 In a minority of states, the fee tail is still recognized, but the entailing effect of
the estate is destroyed in two steps: First, the donee takes a fee tail similar to the famil-
iar life estate. Later, after the death of the first donee, the heirs of his body take the
remainder interest as an estate in fee. The following jurisdictions terminate the fee tail
by two-generation conversions: Arkansas (AaX. STAT. ANN. § 50-405 (1947)); Colorado
(COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118-1-6 (1963)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 47-3 (1958)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.14 (1969)); Hawaii (Kinney v. Oahu
Sugar Co., 22 Hawaii 747 (1917); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 5 (Smith-Hurd
1969)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-503 (1964)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. §
442.470 (1949)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-1-15 (1953)); Ohio (CODE §
2131.08 (Page 1968)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-6-10 (1956)). Two-
step solutions temporarily impede alienability since, without judicial disentailment, no-
body can convey title until the second step - the fee simple estate - has become effec-
tive. This delayed interest also postpones identification of the beneficial interests in the
next generation, the remaindermen, or the bodily heirs of the first donee in tail, those
who will become the eventual second step owners. These two factors in combination
create the problem of assessing the federal tax on the capital gain realized from disen-
tailment sales.
35 For example, under the Ohio statute, a conveyance of a fee tail vests in the first
donee in tail a fee tail interest for life; the statute then provides that at the death of the
first donee, the bodily heirs take a fee simple. CODE § 2131.08 (Page 1968). The
qualities of the lifetime fee tail interest are not the same as those of a life tenant, but
they are comparable for federal income tax purposes. See note 33 supra.
3 6 Apparently the common law fee tail still exists in Delaware, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island (as to estates created by deed, but not by will). RE-
STATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory Note to Ch. 5, Special Note 2, at 203 (1936).
Upon close scrutiny of the statutes in these jurisdictions the modern fee tail estate ap-
pears to have lost some of the restrictive effects it possessed at common law. Depend-
ing on the jurisdiction, the estate may be flexible enough in its modem form not to re-
quire disentailment by judicial sale. For instance, in some states the tenant in tail may
convey a fee simple. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25 § 302 (1953); MASS. GEM. LAws
ANN. ch. 183, § 44 (1958); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 156 (1965).
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land is sold, disentailment is necessary so that the interest of future
generations in the proceeds is protected.
IV. WHO PAYS THE TAX?
The disentailment conveyance is analogous to a judicial sale
based on partition or appropriation by public authority: All three
sales are based on judicial decrees. Because the latter two types
constitute taxable events during the year when the taxpayer has an
unrestricted right to the proceeds of the sale,17 there can be no
doubt that the disentailment sale will be treated similarly. Because
the disentailment sale converts the legal interests in the real estate
into other assets, held by a court-appointed trustee for the benefit
of the remaindermen 8 subject to the prior right of the life tenant
to the income derived from the fund, cash is usually available to
satisfy the immediate tax liability. Assuming a capital gains tax re-
sulting from the sale of the real estate,39 the question is reduced to
the simple inquiry: Who must pay the capital gains tax?
3 7 The judicial sale constitutes the involuntary liquidation of the remainder interest.
There are several other similar taxable events involving the involuntary sale of a tax-
payer's interest in response to the enforceable demands of creditors, public authority,
or concurrent owners. These analogous involuntary terminations of a taxpayer's owner-
ship are taxed unless the nonrecognition sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
apply. See I.RC. §§ 1033, 1034. There are several examples of these taxable events:
(a) Judicial partition sales are taxable events, but the nontaxable exchange provisions
may apply in some circumstances. Rev. Rul. 55-77, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 339; see Harry
F. Estill, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 376 (1960); cf. Mary L. Hunnicutt, 10 B.T.A. 1004
(1928), acquiesced in VII-2 CUM. BULL. 19 (1928). As to sales of personalty, see
Rev. Rul. 56-437, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 507. (b) Judicial sales resulting from a corpora-
tion deadlock will produce an effect which is the same as in partition with respect to the
taxability of the bought-out shareholder. Dear Publication & Radio, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 274 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1960). The Dear court rejected the ingenious argument
that judicial dissolution constituted an involuntary conversion, under I.R.C. § 1033, and
held that the taxpayer whose interest was liquidated could not daim nonrecognition of
gain when the sale proceeds were reinvested in similar property. Presumably the con-
tinuing shareholder would not be taxed since he received property similar in kind for
his shares. (c) Judicial sales at mortgage foredosures to satisfy the unpaid claims of
the mortgagee produce taxable gain or loss. Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504
(1941); Cooperative Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1940).
(d) Appropriation of property by judicial sale at the instance of public authority pro-
duces realized gains and, as such, is a taxable event. Covered Wagon, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 369 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1966); Rich Lumber Co. v. United States, 237 F.2d 424
(1st Cir. 1956); Nitterhouse v. United States, 207 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1953). For a
general review, see Boyce v. United States, 405 F.2d 526 (Ct Cl. 1968).
38 For a discussion of the role of the trustee, see text accompanying notes 12-14,
16-19 supra.
39 In order to secure capital gain treatment for any income the taxpayer must satisfy
the two-pronged test of whether a sale or exchange of a capital asset has taken place.
.C. §§ 1201(b), 1222. Unquestionably the disentailment sale constitutes a sale
within the meaning of the capital gain section. The broad definition of a capital asset
covers most forms of property which might be the subject of a disentailment sale.
See I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1231.
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When an ordinary life estate is sold, the tenant loses the right
to the income earned by the asset in its original form.40  If the
life tenant receives a lump-sum settlement in exchange for his right
to income,4' he is usually taxed at capital gains rates.42 But often,
he will receive instead a continuing right to the income from the
new fund produced by the disentailment sale." When the sale is
effected under judicial authority, so that the life tenant receives no
capital fund, he has instead only a right to future income from the
liquidated estate - from which cash is not available except in the
form of deferred income flow. 44  Obviously, a capital gains tax
40 Frequently, the current income from property is a paltry sum when compared to
the income from its capital value. This is especially true of farmland located near
population centers. Farming often produces negligible income, but sale after disentail-
ment converts the realty into cash and produces increased income for the life tenant.
One such tract in Michigan was presumably sold under the predecessor of MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 600.2930 (1968) because the property's income was barely sufficient to
pay the real estate taxes. Rev. Rul. 59-99, 1959-1 CUm. BULL. 158. To effect a sale
for a high price is often very much in the interest of the life tenant because his income
would increase substantially, being based on more productive capital, and is a strong
argument for early disentailment. Eckhardt & Peterson, Possessory Estates, Future
Interests and Conveyances in Missouri, printed in 23 VERNON's ANN. Mo. STAT. 1,
21-22 (1952).
41 An established commercial market for various types of future interests exists in
the British Isles. Monthly publications describe auctions conducted by Foster & Cran-
field at their London Auction Mart, 155 Queen Victoria Street, London, EC 4, of "Ab-
solute or Contingent Reversions to Funded Property, Annuities, Policies of Assurance,
Life Interests ... and all descriptions of present or prospective Property .... Pam-
phlet No. 1600, advertising Foster & Cranfield Periodic Sale for May 23, 1968.
One method of making such purchases attractive is to complete the sale with life
insurance contracts. As one brochure pointed out, a remainder contingent on survivor-
ship may be the subject of a sale or might be collateral for a loan. In the former case,
the remainderman must take out a survivorship policy with the premium being paid out
of the proceeds. In loan transactions, the borrower pays the premium. When a sale or
a loan on the security of an absolute remainder is made, no survivorship policy is neces-
sary. However, a policy offered as additional security by a borrower usually results in a
substantial lessening of the rate of interest charged on the loan. Public Information
Pamphlet, The Liverpool Reversionary Company Limited, 15 Victoria Street, Liverpool,
England.
4 2 See Allen v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 157 F.2d 592 (5th Cit. 1946),
cert. denied, 330 U.S. 828 (1947); McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cit.
1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947); Estate of Bell v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454
(8th Cir. 1943). Contra, May T. Hrobon, 41 T.C. 476 (1964). Indeed, this result
sets up the means for tax avoidance by converting ordinary income into capital gain.
Plumb, Tax Effects of Sales of Life Interests in Trusts, 9 TAx L. REV. 39 (1953). For
a discussion of resulting federal taxation where the remainder interest is sold, see Dan-
zis, The Favorable Tax Treatment of Remainder Interest Investment, 24 TAX L REV.
527 (1969). This result may be modified by the proposed Tax Reform Act of 1969,
which will eliminate basis in computing the taxable gain. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st
CONG., 1st Sess. 203 (1969).
43 An argument that the tax on gain from such a sale should be deferred until
termination of the life estate was rejected in Gaskill v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 507
(N.D. Tex. 1960).
44 An Ohio statute gives the income to the life tenant. CODE § 5303.30 (Page Supp.
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measured by the profit from the sale of the entire estate would fall
unfairly upon the life tenant, who has received only the right to in-
come payments generated by proceeds from the sale of the asset.
Except for a change in the amount of income flow, this right to in-
come is the same right he had before the sale. Legal technicalities
aside, as a practical matter the life tenant, receiving only income,
would be hard put to pay a large capital gains tax when the capital
itself is sequestered by law in the hands of the court-appointed
trustee and therefore is beyond the beneficiary's reach.4 5  The in-
quiry must turn then to whether the court-appointed trustee should
pay the tax out of the corpus. This becomes essentially a question
of whether the fund is held in trust within the meaning of the fed-
eral income tax pattern. 6
Taxability of the Corpus
The net effect of the disentailment proceeding is to produce a
judicial arrangement quite like an express trust. Title to the pro-
ceeds of the sale is held by the court-appointed trustee who is
charged by law to pay certain expenses, to invest the proceeds,47
and to remit the income to the income beneficiary.48 The trustee
holds the fund until the interest of the first donee is terminated.
Then he must distribute the fund to the remaindermen, to the bodily
heirs of the donee in tail, or to some other ultimate beneficiary.49
1968). Under state property law, appreciation of the corpus of a trust belongs to princi-
pal and therefore it is not distributable as income. See Burchenal v. Commissioner, 150
F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1945). The capital gain of a life estate in property is taxable when
it is realized through sale in the form of capital gains taxes. See note 42 supra. There-
fore, even though such accretions are "income" with respect to federal taxation, they are
not income in the property sense. Accordingly, capital gain "income" cannot be paid to
the income beneficiary by reason of the disentailment statute. See Devenney v. Deven-
ney, 74 Ohio St. 96, 77 NXE. 271 (1906).
The fact that by statute the disentailment income must be paid to the income bene-
ficiary gives the beneficiary a current, continuing, enforceable right. This is impor-
tant in classifying the trust for federal tax purposes. I.R.C. § 651(a) provides that when
all income is required to be distributed currently the trust will be taxed as a so-called
"simple trust." See Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-i (1956). Because the disentailment stat-
ute does not permit accumulations of includable income, a complex trust cannot be
present. I.R.C. § 661(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-i (1956).
45The disentailment decrees carefully provide for distribution of the corpus to the
same beneficiaries who were ultimately entitled to the land itself, rather than to the
life tenant. CODE § 5303.26 (Page 1953).
4 6 See note 16 supra.
47 CODE §§ 5303.26 (Page 1953), 5303.27 (Page Supp. 1968).
481d. § 5303.30 (Page 1953).
49Like Code sections 5303.26 and 5303.27, many disentailnent statutes prescribe
that all proceeds from the sale assume the same character as the property sold, and with
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Because of the similarity between the basic characteristics of the ju-
dicial arrangement for disentailment and the attributes of a trust,
the disentailment procedure has been said to be "clothed with the
characteristics of a trust" and therefore is treated under federal in-
come tax law as the equivalent of an ordinary trust.50
As early as 1937, the taxability of the disentailment sale seemed
settled by the Vanderbilt Mansion case.5 This footnote to the
Gilded Age grew out of the will of the younger Cornelius Vander-
bilt, who died in 1899, and left his palatial home on Fifth Avenue
- not in trust - to his widow for her lifetime, and then to cer-
tain children, carefully providing for various remaindermen in sev-
eral contingencies. The property was sold in 1927, after judicial
disentailment proceedings, during the lifetime of the life tenant,
and before the identity of the remaindermen could be ascertained.52
No tax was paid by the court-appointed trustee, so the government
brought an action for payment of the deficiency. In a perceptive
opinion, the transaction was held taxable to the trustee. In so hold-
ing, the court reasoned that the term "trustee" as used in the federal
income tax statute should be broadly interpreted, rather than re-
stricted to a narrow property law concept. The case is controlling
authority for taxing the gain on a disentailment sale against the cor-
pus, and for holding the trustee liable for the tax.
Notwithstanding the common sense result and persuasive opin-
ion in the Vanderbilt Mansion case, two decades later in United
States v. Cooke"5 it was held that the capital gain on the sale of the
remainderman's interest in a legal estate was not taxable. The deci-
sion opened a gaping tax loophole that produced a chorus of criti-
cism and proposals for corrective legislation. 54  The Cooke result
regard to ultimate distribution are governed by the terms of the instrument creating the
property interest.
50 United States v. DeBonchamps, 278 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1960).
51 National City Bank v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
52The disentailment was accomplished under N.Y. REAL PROP. §§ 67-71 (1920
Consol. Laws), now codified as N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTIONS §§ 1601-15 (McKinney
1963).
53 228 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1955).
54 For support of its decision the majority relied upon the narrower definition of
the term "trust" used in the predecessor to Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (19(0). Thus,
under the Cooke rationale when property subject to a legal life estate was sold, the
capital gain on the sale of the corpus was taxable to no one. The decision was
criticized in 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 487 (1956); 10 OKLA. L. REv. 219 (1957); 1956 U. ILL.
L.F. 294. An annotation in 56 COLuM. L. REv. 947 (1956) agreed with the result,
and the similar district court decision, Cooke v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 830 (D.
Hawaii 1953), was approved in 67 HAiRv. L REv. 1083 (1953). Another district
court decision, in accord with the Cooke case, now seems to be hopelessly obsolete with
DISENTAILMENT SALES
was subsequently rejected by the United States Court of Claims,55
and was completely repudiated in United States v. DeBonchamps.6
There, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a con-
veyance of property subject to the interests of a life tenant and re-
maindermen was to be treated as the equivalent of a sale by a trus-
tee, and any gain resulting therefrom was taxable to the trustee.
Treasury rulings taxing disentailment sales effected under authority
of state law57 and sales made under a testamentary power of sale,5
now confirm that this is the only correct result.
Whether by express power of sale, by inherent judicial author-
ity, or by disentailment statute, the federal tax result now seems
dear: Property subject to divided interests must bear the capital
gains tax when sold. There is no longer any doubt that the disen-
tailment trustee must be taxed like any other fiduciary without re-
gard to the terminology applied by local law in defining his legal
status as the court's representative.59 The trustee is required by fed-
eral law to report the taxable income on Form 104160 and to pay the
resulting income tax. 61
the later current of contrary opinion. Gaskill v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 507 (N.D.
Tex. 1960).
To resolve the problem raised by Cooke, the Trust and Partnership Income Tax
Revision Bill of 1960, H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., was passed by the House of
Representatives on Feb. 4, 1960. The section dealing with the life estate loophole was
deleted by the Senate after United States v. DeBonchamps, 278 F.2d 127 (9th Cit. 1960),
resolved the question in favor of taxability. S. REP. No. 1616, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1960).
55 Weil v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 407 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822
(1960); accord, Robinson v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 253 (D. Ga. 1961).
56 278 F.2d 127 (9th Cit. 1960). For a discussion of the DeBonchamps decision,
see 74 HARv. L. REV. 418 (1960); 28 U. CM. L. REV. 520 (1961); 46 VA. L. REV.
1470 (1960); 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (1961).
5 7 Rev. Rul. 59-99, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 158.
58 Rev. Rul. 61-102, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 245.
50 A trustee is considered to be a fiduciary under federal income tax law. I.R.C. §
7701(a)(6).
60 .R.C. § 641(b).
61 Commissioner v. Owens, 78 F.2d 768 (10th Cit. 1935). Contra, Axe v. United
States, 191 F. Supp. 671 (D. Kan. 1961). When the gain on a sale of corpus is dis-
tributable to an income beneficiary, all the gain is taxable to him and not to the trustee.
Estate of Edward H. Wadewitz, 32 T.C. 538 (1959); Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, 11 T.C.
868 (1948), acquiesced in 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 1.
When considering whether the trustee will be taxed, several additional factors are
relevant Mere terminology of local property law will not control the federal tax re-
sults. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940); 10 J. MERTENS, supra note 13, at §
61.05. The decisions of lower state courts also will not necessarily control the outcome
of the federal tax result Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
Notice that even when a life tenant has unfettered authority to sell and consume for
his own benefit, he lacks a fee simple. Yet tax law does not recognize the interests of
the remaindermen. When the proceeds of a trust corpus are available to the life tenant
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Compensating the Life Tenant
Upon completing a disentailment sale and depositing the pro-
ceeds, the trustee must discharge fiduciary duties which should be
considered in making the sale in the first place. These duties include
payment of the expenses incurred in the management of the fund
such as trustee compensation and payment of real estate taxes.
These expenses are charged by law against the income produced by
the fund.62  The federal tax on any capital gain must be paid as
well; however, this charge will be paid out of the corpus. After
the capital gains tax has been paid, the income generated by the
fund will be reduced because of the smaller amount of capital in-
vested. In addition, the normally recurring charges for manage-
ment expenses will further reduce the amount of income available
for distribution to the life tenant. Where the entailed land pro-
duced a reasonable income flow prior to its sale, the life tenant's in-
come might be substantially reduced and his financial posture weak-
ened by the income loss following payment of the tax on the capital
gain and the normal expenses paid by the trustee out of the income.
But, in many cases the opposite situation will be characteristic.
Meager farm income may be replaced by a larger income flow from
a corpus that has been expanded by increased prices paid in land de-
velopments. Here the income beneficiary is much better off with
the sale completed.
Disentailment is a discretionary remedy and not a matter of right.
In some jurisdictions, if the court is of the opinion "that [the] sale
would be for the benefit of the person holding the first ... estate,"'"
it may authorize the sale. Certainly, the effect that payment of the
at any time, they are therefore subject to the capital gains tax payable by the tenant at
the time of sale. When this broad power of invasion exists, the lack of an effective
legal limitation eliminates the two-party succession, and the tax liability is borne by the
income beneficiary. Hirschman v. United States, 309 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962). Even
though the income beneficiary has the power to consume the corpus, in the absence of
express language to the contrary in the grant, there is a tendency for the courts to re-
quire good faith exercise of the power. See Funk v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 127 (3d
Cit. 1950); Johnson v. Johnson, 51 Ohio St. 446, 38 N.E. 61 (1894); 4 L. SIMEs
& A. SMITH, supra note 11, at § 1716.
6 2 CODE § 5303.30 (Page 1953).
63 Where the sale of the corpus has produced taxable capital gain, the income tax
resulting from the sale has uniformly been held to be properly assessable against the
corpus rather than against the income to the life tenant. For a detailed development
of this proposition, see United States Trust Co. v. Jones, 414 Ill. 265, 111 N.E.2d 144
(1953); In re Warms Estate, 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sur. Ct. 1955); RESTATEMENT (SE -
OND) OF TRUSTS § 233, comment f (1959). Compare Holmes v. Hrobon, 158 Ohio
St. 508, 110 N.E.2d 574 (1953), with Annot., 108 A.L.R. 1138 (1937) and 33 AM.
JUR. Life Estates § 437 (1941).
64 CODE § 5303.23 (Page 1953).
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capital gains tax has on the net income flow available to the life
tenant would appear an important factor in determining the rela-
tive benefit or injury produced by the sale. However, in many
jurisdictions disentailment statutes were enacted at the time of the
Civil War, long before the modern federal tax on capital gains be-
came a fact of life.65 Courts in these jurisdictions may refuse to con-
sider the reduced principal after the tax is paid as an important fac-
tor in the statutory pattern of weighing the relative benefits. On
the other hand, if protection of the life tenant's interest is domi-
nant, by the exercise of judicial discretion the court might permit
the life tenant to be compensated for the lost income by computing
the amount of income which would have been earned by the gross
fund as though no corpus invasion had been required to pay the
capital gains tax. The judicial sale might be treated as the event
that accelerated the capital gains tax into the income beneficiary's
lifetime, and the amount of lost income caused by the reduction of
corpus through payment of taxes could be paid to the life tenant
out of the capital by a compensating periodic award. Disburse-
ments paid to the income beneficiary out of the corpus would re-
store income to the level that would have resulted if no capital
gains tax had been paid. The income beneficiary's loss of present
income would thereby be replaced at the expense of the ultimate
successors, which often is the grantor's preference and intent. If, at
some future time, they had sold the land, the contingent successors
would have been required to pay the capital gains tax. This earlier
sale during the life tenancy merely accelerated the latent capital
gains tax liability.
An important factor in such treatment lies in the degree to which
the life tenant has received diminished or increased benefits from
the sale. As a practical matter, life tenants would not voluntarily
sell their interest if it meant a subsequent reduction in income, and
courts would not permit disentailment if this were the prospect.
When the disentailment sale is made, the life tenant may well re-
ceive some increase in income flow. The real obstacle to compen-
sating the life tenant is the possibility of unreasonable detriment to
the remaindermen. If the life tenant is compensated by supple-
menting his income with payments from the corpus, the future in-
come yield from the invested corpus will decline in proportion to
65 The Ohio disentailment statute was enacted in 1859; many others date from that
era. The federal individual income tax became effective in 1913, nearly six decades
later.
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the corpus reduction. This, in turn, will necessitate increased pay-
ments from corpus to the life tenant in order to compensate for the
further income loss, thus compounding and accelerating the reduc-
tion of corpus. Since by law the desirability of a disentailment sale
must be based upon the relative benefit likely to accrue to the ulti-
mate takers, 6  an equity court will weigh these countervailing
considerations in determining whether to adopt some such plan to
compensate the life tenant.
The Persistency of Default
Responsibility for payment of the capital gains tax rests upon
the trustee. When the responsibility goes unfulfilled, and the tax
returns become delinquent, the federal tax obligations do not disap-
pear with the passage of time. Some trustee - whoever he may be
- is the responsible taxpayer, and until a proper tax return is filed,
the statute of limitations applicable to collection of the tax never
begins to run.68 When the unsatisfied income tax obligation is dis-
covered, often years after the disentailment sale,6 9 returns will have
been in default,70 suggesting the possibility of expensive penalties
for delinquency7' and the assured cost of accumulated annual inter-
est at 6 percent 72 - a rate which may exceed the historial earnings
6 6 See CODE § 5303.23 (Page 1953).
67 I.R.C. § 641(b). If the trustee distributes his fund without paying the income
tax imposed upon him as fiduciary, he will be personally liable for an amount up to the
value of the assets he distributed. 31 U.S.C. § 192 (1964).
68 I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3).
69 This potential time lag is well illustrated by the Vanderbilt Mansion case. See
text accompanying notes 51-52 supra. Although the property was sold in 1927, liabil-
ity for taxes was not asserted until years later. The resultant levy for taxes and interest
amounted to $116,365 for 1926, and a staggering $688,324 for 1927. National City
Bank v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). Interest on the delinquent
taxes approached 60 percent of the total payment.
70 A fiduciary is required to file Form 1041 within 3V months after the close of the
fiscal year. I.R.C. §§ 641(b), 6012(b)(4), 6072(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-3(a)(1)
(1958). Of course, extensions may be granted upon application. I.R.C. § 6081. Even
so, the estimated tax must be paid, and interest is payable on the balance unpaid by the
due date of the return.
71 A delinquency penalty of 5 percent for each month, up to a total of 25 percent,
based on the net amount due, is assessed for failure to file required returns by the due
date plus extensions. I.R.C. § 6651.
72The interest due on tax deficiencies is fixed by statute at 6 percent. I.R.C. §
6 6 01(a). There is no authority to abate the interest; it must be collected on every
assessment against a solvent taxpayer. Priess v. United States, 42 F. Supp. 89 (D. Wash.
1941). Few funds can consistently earn 6 percent when they are carefully invested
under the strict investment standards imposed by Code section 5303.27 (Page 1953). A
strict interpretation of the Ohio disentailment statute could deprive the life tenant of in-
come in the year of settlement with the government for past-due taxes. The life tenant
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of the fund. These arrearages, collected in a lump sum, may
threaten the life tenant with financial crisis in the form of destruc-
tion of the current income from the fund and might also produce
the possibility of surcharge against the defaulting trustee.
Where the trustee is liable for surcharge, a claim against coun-
sel for malpractice may soon follow. Negligent tax advice has been
held to be the basis for malpractice.73  The increased standard of
care required of professionals, evidenced by an expansion of the
locality rule in medical malpractice suits, may be a portent of future
growth; 74 if so, the work of counsel in a real estate disentailment
proceeding might teasonably include the duty to consider also the
peculiar tax consequences of disentailment sales.
V. CONCLUSION
Many socio-economic forces stimulate the desire of people to con-
vert their real property into other forms of wealth. One such fac-
is entitled only to the net ordinary income from the fund, if the meaning of the badly
drafted statute is correctly understood to exclude capital gains. See CODE § 5303.30
(Page 1953). Under recognized concepts of property law the tax would be charged
back, in the year when it is paid, against the current income from the fund. The inter-
est payable on the income tax, unpaid for several years, would come due in a lump sum.
This back interest might consume more than the current annual earnings from the fund,
and, therefore, could easily exceed the distributable net income in the year of payment,
leaving the life tenant without income. In such a situation, the discretionary nature of
the remedy of disentailment might be invoked. CODE § 5303.23 (Page 1953).
7 3 Erroneous tax advice arising from negligence has been held to be the basis for
recovery against the professional. Bancroft v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America, 203
F. Supp. 49 (D. La. 1962) (CPA held liable for bad advice on tax effects of a cor-
porate reorganization); L.B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell, 39 Cal. 2d 56, 244 P.2d
385 (1952) (CPA held liable for delay in filing); Linder v. Barlon, Davis & Wood,
210 Cal. App. 660, 27 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1962) (CPA held not liable, under the facts,
for paying tax on non-taxable widow's death benefit); Rassieur v. Charles, 354 Mo.
117, 188 S.W.2d 817 (1945) (CPA held liable for extra tax cost in handling securi-
ties); Grob, The Responsibilities and Legal Liabilities of the CPA in Tax Practice, 25
J. TAXAToN 296 (1966). For possible application to attorneys, see Kartikes v. Demos,
214 So. 2d 86 (Dist Ct. App. Fla. 1968).
74 Developments in the law of medical malpractice have signalled the imminent de-
mise of the locality rule. Two jurisdictions no longer measure professional duty by
the standards of the smaller community, but by a wider area coextensive with all the
facilities readily available and accessible. Brune v. Balinkoff, 354 Mass. 100, 235
N.E.2d 793 (1968); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967),
noted in 46 N.C.L. REV. 680 (1968); Stewart, The Locality Rule in Medical Mal-
practice Suits, 5 CALIF. WES. L. REv. 134 (1968). Lawyers are not generally engaged
as parties in a conspiracy of professional silence, the practice that has partially sparked
the trend toward minimizing use of the local area rule. See Avey v. St. Francis
Hospital, 201 Kan. 687, 442 P.2d 1013 (1968); Stewart, supra at 132. Nevertheless,
one questions how long will it be until malpractice in the legal profession will be mea-
sured by a broader area standard. Such change might also call for a duty to consult
with specialists available in the area. For a partial answer, see Cook, Flanagan &
Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 438 P.2d 865 (1968).
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tor is the potential for large profits on sales to land developers.
With this trend the disentailment sale will continue to play an oc-
casional role in our legal practice. This modern remnant of dusty
strands of English land law reaches across nine centuries, from the
castles of the Norman overlords into the law offices of modern Am-
erica. Who can be surprised that the seamless web also leads into
the office of the federal tax collector?
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